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Vygotsky, Brandom and Psychology 
JAN DERRY 
Institute of Education, University of London 
Tetsuro Matsuzawa's (2006) research on chimpanzee intelligence and the 'concept' of 
number established in a female chimpanzee named Ai and her male offspring Ayumu 
has demonstrated the ability of chimps to succeed in tasks which humans find difficult. 
The ability of Ayumu to demonstrate a recall of number order is taken as evidence 
that Ayumu has a concept of number, but this raises questions about the distinctive 
nature of human thought and of the human concept of number. What processes 
are involved when humans, attempting the same task as chimpanzees, achieve 
poorly? Our cognitive powers clearly distinguish us from animals and machines 
yet many accounts of our relation to the world fail to recognize this or if they do, 
fail to give it sufficient importance. According to Moll and Tomasello (2007) while 
non-human primates demonstrate a limited form of intentionality, they lack the shared 
intentionality that characterises the uniquely human aspects of cognition. Almost all 
primates display social behaviour, however, humans demonstrate a distinctive form 
of cooperative activity and unlike other primates they can cooperate without the 
prospect of immediate self gain. Human cooperative activities are characterized by the 
inclusion of shared goals, shared attention and coordinated roles. One of the defining 
characteristics of humans as thinking animals is the ability to abstract from context and 
to see it from a different perspective from one's own (i.e. to 'decenter' or to 'disembed' 
from an immediate situation, Piaget, 1967, Donaldson, 1986). Tomasello highlights 
the importance of cooperative activity in supporting the ability to take a different 
perspective. He argues that a 'difference in perspective can occur only when two 
people see the same thing, but differently' (Tomasello, 2007, p. 645). He goes as far as 
to argue that human cognition is nor merely supported by, but is constituted by social 
cooperation; 'participation in interactions involving shared intentionality transforms 
human cognition in fundamental ways. Moll and Tomasello endorse Vygotsky's work 
on the social formation of mind when they argue that it is through cultural interactions 
during ontogeny that children develop their cognitive capacities. Relevant points of 
Vygotsky's (1987) research on the sociogenesis of mind are: firstly, higher mental 
functions cannot be understood as originating solely in lower ones since they arise 
inter-mentally before they arise intra-mentally and secondly, language structures and 
constitutes thought rather than merely expressing it so that when words are first learnt 
or used, the development of their meaning has only just begun. 
The social nature of the human mind has generally been approached in education 
studies in terms of a multiplicity of forms of thought tied to context rather than in terms 
of an examination of what is distinctively and universally human about its character, 
however recent developments in philosophy, emphasising the normativity underlying 
our contact with the world, suggest a different approach. It is our responsiveness to 
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reasons that distinguishes us from animals. The philosopher Robert Brandom provides 
a powerful illustration of this point when he contrasts the response of a human being 
to a fire with that of a machine. For Brandom the distinguishing feature of a thinking 
being is its responsiveness to reasons rather than simply to causes. Responsiveness to 
causes is characteristic of a machine or a parrot capable of responding differentially to 
a stimulus, but not of thinking beings. A mechanical alarm may be far more effective 
than human beings in perceiving the dangers of a fire and sounding the alert. But 
when a human being shouts 'fire!' he or she is always doing more than simply making 
a warning noise. When a child of five (as opposed to a much younger child whose 
uttered sounds are only just beginning to operate as language) shouts 'fire!' he or she 
knows its implications. He or she appreciates the consequences of the exclamation 'fire!' 
and what follows from such an utterance. Brandom uses this example to illustrate 
his claim that human beings act and communicate inferentially. His point is that 
what distinguishes the human form of knowing from the type of 'knowing' we might 
ascribe to a machine is the point made by Wilfred Sellars that knowing for a human 
being, consists not merely in expressing a response but in knowing what follows from 
it-knowing the implications, or what Brandom calls the 'giving and asking of reasons' . 
As Brandom puts it 'even non-inferential reports must be inferentially articulated' and 
this point is crucial to any understanding of human intellect. 
To return to an alarm 'perceiving' a fire, this is already an anthropomorphism which 
Brandom takes care to avoid. He talks of machines 'responding differentially to 
stimuli' by which he means they respond mechanically to a stimulus. The use of the 
phrase 'responding differentially' in place of 'perceiving' or 'knowing' is of crucial 
importance for it introduces a distinction that is hidden by anthropomorphic language. 
The stimulus in this case-the fire-is the cause of their response; in the case of the 
human being who sounds the alarm, the fire is the reason for their response. The human 
perceives the fire as fire; that is to say that unlike a machine it has a concept of fire as 
part of a system of concepts. For Brandom making a report as a human being is not 
'responding differentially' but inferring rather than merely representing. 
According to another contemporary philosopher and colleague of Brandom, John 
McDowell, a normative context is necessary for humans to be in touch with the world 
at all and, it can be argued, this relies upon the specific form of cooperation outlined 
by Moll and Tomasello. Without shared goals, a shared attentional framework and 
coordinated roles, perspective taking in relation to an object would not be possible. This 
observation is already anticipated in Wittgenstein's consideration of the possibility of 
a private language. Wittgenstein is at pains to show that the argument that words map 
onto representations in a person's mind thereby admitting the possibility of a private 
language understandable by only a single individual, is incoherent. Any individual use 
of terms is dependent upon their shared use. Reference depends on sociality, hence 
Wittgenstein is able to argue that meanings are constituted via social practices rather 
than direct unmediated relations to the world. 
The account of what is entailed in a social conception of mind is at odds with the 
dominant representational paradigm where thought is conceived in terms of individual 
mental states. Within the dominant paradigm language meaning is understood as a 
matter of referential relationships between signs and objects and it is all too often 
assumed that humans learn in ways not very different from other forms of life. The 
account of mind found in Vygotsky's work places weight on the primacy of the 
social in the development of cognitive capacities. The human infant responds in 
an environment where the significance which conditions its response and thereby 
contact with the world is, in the first place, mediated by other human beings. The 
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child responds to reasons. In place of the event or object being the sole source of the 
response, the parent or other significant actors provide the active conditions which are 
decisive in giving meaning for the child's early responses. Thus meaning is a product 
of a social process and its significance relies on other actors and their relationships to 
each other and the world i.e. it is necessarily social. According to McDowell '[h ]uman 
beings ... are born mere animals, and they are transformed into thinkers and intentional 
agents in the course of coming to maturity'. Language in this context plays a crucial 
role since 'in being initiated into a language, a human being is introduced to something 
that already embodies ... rational linkages between concepts ... constitutive of the layout 
of the space of reasons' (McDowell, 1996, p. 125). 
Although far removed from education, these ideas in psychology and philosophy 
should have implications for how we approach teaching and learning. Although the 
ability to abstract is privileged in schooling, an appreciation of what it entails is 
poorly understood and is due in part to the dominant influence of the representational 
paradigm. For instance poor teaching practices in so far as they rely on understanding 
meaning in terms of the relation of a sign, word or concept to the object or event which 
it represents, presuppose the representational paradigm. Brandom's argument that an 
account of meaning must privilege inference over representation offers a means of 
addressing questions of pedagogy and curricula in the widest possible context of the 
development of mind. Brandom approaches the 'contents of conceptually explicit 
propositions or principles from the direction of what is implicit in practices of using 
expressions and acquiring or deploying beliefs' (Brandom, 1996, p. 4). This approach 
reverses the representational order of understanding. As Brandom states; 
... to have conceptual content is just for it [a concept] to playa role in the inferential 
game of making claims and giving and asking for reasons. To grasp or understand 
such a concept is to have practical mastery over the inferences it is involved in-to 
know, in the practical sense of being able to distinguish, what follows from the 
applicability of a concept, and what it follows from (Brandom, 1994). 
The absence of any appreciation of an alternative to the approach to the representational 
approach to meaning can lead to a damaging relativism where the need to articulate the 
nature of a knowledge domain is ignored. The renowned physicist Richard Feynman 
(1981) provides an illustration of this misunderstanding of meaning when he recounts 
his experience of learning as a child. He tells how he was challenged by a fellow boy to 
demonstrate whether he knew a bird. When Feynman is unable to say the bird's name 
he is accused of ignorance by the child. However, F eynman ends his account of his 
early experience by reeling off a list of names for the bird in a variety of languages and 
then exclaims that it show nothing at all of his knowledge of the bird since knowledge 
is not familiarity with the name of the bird but full awareness of the inferential domain 
in which the name is located. Effective pedagogy entails providing access to the 
inferential domain which constitutes the meaning of a concept, as a prerequisite for its 
acquisition i.e. taking account of the distinctively social nature of the human mind. 
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